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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—ANSWERING JUSTICE
BARRETT’S FULTON PROMPT: THE CASE FOR A NARROW
RECONSIDERATION OF FREE EXERCISE
ANDREW LAVENDER*
INTRODUCTION
In Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court, for the second
time in three years,1 considered a case involving the conflict between First
Amendment religious, speech, and associational freedoms and the civil
rights of the LGBTQ community.2 And, for the second time, the Court
arrived at an apparent compromise, issuing a narrow, factual ruling in
favor of the party seeking an exception from antidiscrimination law while
avoiding any firm precedent that might create a broader exception.3
Andrew Lavender is a solo attorney based out of Hadley, Massachusetts. His practice
focuses on representing the rights of individuals against the State, particularly in the contexts of
child welfare, criminal defense, and civil rights. He graduated summa cum laude from Western
New England University School of Law in 2021 where he was the Senior Note Editor of the
Law Review. He has a bachelor’s degree in History from Hampshire College, 2013.
1. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). In
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., the Court was asked whether a baker could refuse to make a
wedding cake for a same-sex wedding when the baker objected to same-sex marriage on
religious grounds, a question it did not answer, finding instead that comments made by members
of the Civil Rights Commission showed that they treated the baker’s religious claims with
hostility, thereby violating his rights. Id. at 1731–32.
2. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021). This case arose from a Catholic
foster care agency’s refusal to certify same-sex couples as foster parents, which Philadelphia
claimed violated the nondiscrimination requirement in its foster care contract. Id. at 1874. The
Court held that because the contract allowed for discretionary exemptions from the
nondiscrimination requirement, the requirement was not generally applicable, and under the
circumstances, where every other foster care agency in the city was willing to certify same-sex
couples, and no same-sex couple had ever even approached the petitioner’s agency, the City
could not deny an exemption. Id. at 1878, 1881–82.
3. See id. at 1882. For analysis of the Court’s evasive decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. see, for example, Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Establishment Clause
Appeasement, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 297–301 (2020); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Masterpiece Cakeshop—A Troublesome Application of Free Exercise Principles By a Court
429
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In addition to this substantive dodge, the Court also “sidestep[ped]”4
the question on which certiorari had been granted: whether to overrule
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith.5 In Smith, the Court ruled, in upholding the denial of
unemployment benefits to the respondents on the basis of their religiously
motivated peyote usage, that a “generally applicable and otherwise valid”
law does not offend the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
when the law incidentally burdens religious activity.6
Despite granting certiorari, months of briefing, and oral argument on
the question of whether to overturn Smith, the Court ultimately avoided
the question altogether. The Court found that a single provision in the
city’s contract—which gave the Commissioner of the Department of
Human Services discretion to make exceptions from its nondiscrimination
provisions—meant the legal scheme was not neutral or generally
applicable, and was thus outside the scope of Smith.7 Thus, the decision
avoided two thorny questions in a single swoop: whether to overrule
Smith, and where to draw the line between religious liberty interests and
LGBTQ nondiscrimination interests.8 As Justice Gorsuch observed in
concurrence, Fulton, like Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, failed to even provide decisive guidance within the
litigation itself, as the government actors in both cases could simply close
the “non-neutral” loopholes that had removed their action from Smith’s
protections—putting the litigants right back where they had started.9
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Fulton was Justice Barrett’s
Determined to Avoid Hard Questions, TAKE CARE (June 7, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/
blog/masterpiece-cakeshop-a-troublesome-application-of-free-exercise-principles-by-a-courtdetermined-to-avoid-hard-questions [https://perma.cc/32JY-J7J4]. For analysis of Fulton, see
infra Part IV.
4. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1926 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
5. See id. (citing Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
6. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
7. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1878.
8. See id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Perhaps our colleagues believe today’s
circuitous path will at least steer the Court around the controversial subject matter and avoid
‘picking a side.’”).
9. Id. at 1929–31; see also id. at 1887 (Alito, J., concurring). While Justice Gorsuch
accurately described litigation that followed the narrow ruling in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.,
his warnings about the future of the Fulton litigation proved unfounded, with the city recently
reaching an agreement to pay Catholic Social Services’ legal bills and to exempt the agency
from its nondiscrimination requirements. Julia Terruso, Philadelphia Reaches $2 Million
Settlement with Catholic Foster-Care Agency, Aiming to Prevent Future Challenges to LGBTQ
Rights, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 22, 2021), https://www.inquirer.com/news/foster-carephiladelphia-catholic-church-lgbtq-settlement-supreme-court-20211122.html [https://perma.cc
/5H75-4LJK]. However, he was correct that the dodge in Fulton could only delay a decision on
resolving the critical substantive questions avoided by the majority, a delay that is not
particularly beneficial to parties on either side of the dispute.
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concurrence, joined by Justice Kavanaugh in full and Justice Breyer
except for a single paragraph.10 In the opinion, the newest Justice agreed
that Smith’s neutrality rule was problematic, but mused that proposed
alternatives did not satisfactorily capture the nuance of free exercise
claims involving neutral and generally applicable laws.11 Justice Barrett
also noted questions that might arise if Smith were overturned before
concluding that the case did not require resolving those questions because
the discretionary exception provision rendered the city’s actions nonneutral.12
Justices Alito and Gorsuch also wrote concurrences, joined by Justice
Thomas,13 in which they admonished the majority for its failure to
overrule Smith,14 and Justice Barrett for her professed hesitation in
deciding how to replace Smith.15
It is tempting to speculate, as Justice Gorsuch did, as to the
motivations of both the majority and the three “middle” Justices in
Fulton.16 Justice Breyer, for instance, first called for the Court to
reconsider Smith in 1997,17 and there is no shortage of suggestions for
replacing Smith in the scholarly literature.18
But at the same time, the Court’s equivocation in both Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. and Fulton, along with Justice Barrett’s concurrence,
suggest that there is a decisive bloc of Justices on the Court who at least
wish to appear genuinely concerned with finding the right balance
between the religious liberty and antidiscrimination interests at stake in
such cases. Because we can neither read the minds of the Justices nor tap
into their private conversations, it seems most prudent to assume that those
Justices are genuinely looking for an answer to the question: “what should
replace Smith?”19
This Article assumes that Smith’s time as good law is limited, and
10. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1882–83 (Barrett, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 1883.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 1926 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1926–31 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 1883–1926 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
15. See id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“We hardly need to ‘wrestle’ today with
every conceivable question that might follow from recognizing Smith was wrong.” (quoting id.
at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring))).
16. Id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Perhaps our colleagues believe today’s
circuitous path will at least steer the Court around the controversial subject matter and avoid
‘picking a side.’”).
17. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 566 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting),
superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1 to cc-5.
18. See, e.g., Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1899, 1899 n.34; Nelson Tebbe, The Principle and
Politics of Liberty of Conscience, 135 HARV. L. REV. 267, 269, 269 n.16 (2021).
19. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1882 (Barrett, J., concurring).
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that Justice Barrett’s question is all that remains. Given that, this Article
will advance the argument that if Smith is to be overruled, the Court should
not look to replace it with any sort of “‘grand unified theory’ of the Free
Exercise Clause.”20 Rather, it should overrule it narrowly by simply
stating that the decision was wrong—that a law that burdens religious
conduct is not automatically constitutional because it is a neutral law of
general applicability, and otherwise leave its free exercise jurisprudence
undisturbed. In other words, the answer to the question, “what should
replace Smith?,”21 is . . . nothing.
There are some obvious counters to this argument. Justice Gorsuch
advanced a similar argument in his Fulton concurrence,22 although he also
joined Justice Alito’s call for replacing Smith with strict scrutiny.23 Thus,
this path was available to Justice Barrett and her colleagues, and they
chose not to take it. However, that they declined this option in Fulton
does not mean that they will reject it in perpetuity; and this Article seeks
to flesh out the case for a “skinny repeal” of Smith in a much more detailed
manner than Justice Gorsuch did. Furthermore, there are three other
Justices—Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kagan and Sotomayor—
who offered no opinion on the fate of Smith, but who could affect the
outcome in a future case challenging it.24
This Article will argue from a legalistic standpoint that overturning
Smith does not require addressing any of the questions that Justice Barrett
posed. Some of the issues raised would not be affected one way or the
other, while others may even be brought into greater clarity if Smith—
which is incongruous with much other First Amendment law—were cast
aside. In fact, almost all the questions would be answered by other case
law that would no longer need to be read for consistency with Smith.
Additionally, there are strong prudential reasons to favor a narrow
decision overturning Smith. Free exercise jurisprudence is riddled with

20. Id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 1882 (Barrett, J., concurring).
22. See id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
23. See id. at 1924 (Alito, J., concurring).
24. Additionally, before Smith is again reconsidered, Justice Breyer will likely be
succeeded by Ketanji Brown Jackson, who has followed the now-familiar tradition of Supreme
Court nominees refraining from “comment on the Supreme Court’s precedents.” Nomination
of Ketanji Brown Jackson to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 117th Cong. (2022)
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21566443/judge-ketanji-brown-jackson-responsesto-written-questions-from-the-senate-judiciary-committee.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TB2-25YB]
(questioning by Senator Chuck Grassley) (statements of Ketanji Brown Jackson citing Brown
v. Bd. Of Educ., 347 U.S. 485 (1954), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) as the only prior Supreme Court cases she could
affirmatively state were correctly decided and “beyond dispute”).
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inconsistencies, vague reasoning, and apparent motivated reasoning.25
Smith may well have been doctrinal error, and it certainly has its share of
critics from across the political spectrum.26 But it is hard to ignore the
consistency with which the Court’s free exercise outcomes have varied
based on the favorability of the Court’s majority toward the particular
claimant.27 The history of free exercise shows that one decade’s
exemption seeker is the next decade’s denier. Narrowly overhauling
Smith could correct a doctrinal error, while avoiding setting the Court in
an aggressive new direction that it may later wish to backtrack.
This Article consists of five Parts. Part I will summarize key free
exercise concepts and briefly sketch the history of free exercise
jurisprudence prior to Smith. Part II will examine the Court’s pivotal
decision in Smith. Part III will examine the political, judicial, and
scholarly backlash to Smith. Part IV will discuss Smith’s narrow survival
in Fulton, and the state of free exercise jurisprudence at the close of the
2020–21 Supreme Court Term. Finally, Part V will argue that if the Court
overrules Smith, it should do so in a narrow manner that leaves its other
free exercise precedents in place to guide lower courts while it decides
new free exercise issues as they arise.
I. FROM COMPLETE DEFERENCE TO STRICT SCRUTINY: FREE
EXERCISE PRE-SMITH
The Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that
“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion].”28 The Supreme Court has recognized that the “exercise” of
religion includes both beliefs, which the law cannot touch in any way, and
physical acts, which may yield to the law under certain circumstances.29
Drawing the line where religious acts must yield to government action has
been a highly contentious issue. Particularly troublesome has been the
issue of when a law that is neutral in its terms (for example, a prohibition
on wearing hats in court), and general in its applicability (because all who
come to the court are bound by the law), incidentally conflicts with a
religious practice (for example, a Jewish person’s wearing of a yarmulke).
25. See infra Part I.
26. See Tebbe, supra note 18, at 269 n.16 (citing scholarly critiques and defenses of Smith
from both liberal and conservative thinkers).
27. See infra Section V.B.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
29. See, e.g., Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990),
superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000bb, bb-1 to bb-4, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963), abrogation recognized by Holt v. Hobbs, 574
U.S. 352 (2015); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643–44 (1943) (Black,
J., and Douglas, J., concurring).
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The question of when the First Amendment requires exemptions in such
circumstances has long bedeviled judges.
The early historical record is sparse as to the meaning of free exercise
in the context of neutral, generally applicable laws. In his Fulton
concurrence, Justice Alito relied heavily on the work of Michael W.
McConnell, a legal historian, to argue that Smith’s non-exemption rule
was inconsistent with the original meaning of the Constitution.30
However, McConnell himself “was willing to venture no more than that
‘constitutionally compelled exemptions from generally applicable laws
regulating conduct were within the contemplation of the framers and
ratifiers as a possible interpretation of the free exercise clause,’”31 and
other scholars have observed that even many of the cases cited by
McConnell from the early Republic disallowed religious exemptions.32
The Supreme Court did not consider such a case for the first century
after the Revolution. That changed in 1878 when George Reynolds
challenged his conviction for bigamy on the basis that it was his “duty” as
a “male member[] of [the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints] . . . to practise [sic] polygamy.”33 In strained, possibly resultsmotivated reasoning, the Court referenced statements from Thomas
Jefferson on the separation of church and state, and concluded that while
the First Amendment deprived Congress “of all legislative power over
mere opinion, [it] was left free to reach actions which were in violation of
social duties or subversive of good order.”34
This non-exemption rule persisted through the early twentieth
century. In 1940, the case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis
reaffirmed the principal when it upheld the expulsion of two Jehovah’s
Witness children from a Pennsylvania public school “for refusing to salute
the national flag as part of a daily school exercise.”35 In language that
30. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1900–07. Justice Alito relies primarily on McConnell’s The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409
(1990), and historical sources cited therein.
31. Flores, 521 U.S. at 537–38 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting McConnell, supra note
30, at 1415), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1 to cc-5.
32. See Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REV. 117,
124–26 (1993).
33. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878).
34. Id. at 164. The quoted statement by Jefferson referred only to the Establishment
Clause and is ambiguous at best on whether the Constitution compels religious exemptions from
neutral laws. Other language the Court used, such as referring to polygamy as “odious among
the northern and western nations of Europe,” and “almost exclusively a feature of the life of
Asiatic and of African people,” further indicates the sentiments that may have motivated the
result. Id.
35. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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would be revived in Smith, the majority stated that “[c]onscientious
scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not
aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.”36
However, in 1943, the Court did an abrupt about-face in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, overturning Gobitis and
holding that the First Amendment protected the rights of Jehovah’s
Witnesses to refuse to salute the flag in public schools.37 The Barnette
opinion does not meticulously separate out the First Amendment rights at
issue, and it reads more as a rejection of compelling displays of patriotism
than as an endorsement of religious exemptions.38 However, it is a
noteworthy example of a case where religiously motivated conduct was
judicially exempted from a neutral law of general applicability.
Additionally, Justices Black and Douglas—who changed their positions
from Gobitis to Barnette—concurred with language suggesting that
neutral and generally applicable laws might be held to a higher standard
when in conflict with religious conduct, stating that religion must only
yield “to laws which are either imperatively necessary to protect society
as a whole from grave and pressingly imminent dangers or which, without
any general prohibition, merely regulate time, place or manner of religious
activity.”39
This concurrence may have foreshadowed what was to come. In
1963, the Court considered the case of Sherbert v. Verner.40 In that case,
a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church was denied
unemployment compensation because of her refusal to accept work that
would require her to work on Saturday, her Sabbath.41 Although the
unemployment law requiring “availab[ility] for work” was “uniformly
applied,”42 the majority found that the state lacked any “compelling state
interest” to justify the substantial infringement on religious liberty.43
36. Id. at 594.
37. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
38. See id. at 641–42:
To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary
and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering
estimate of the appeal of [American] institutions to free minds . . . .
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein.
39. Id. at 643–44 (Black, J., and Douglas, J., concurring).
40. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), abrogation recognized by Holt v. Hobbs,
574 U.S. 352 (2015).
41. Id. at 399–400.
42. Id. at 419 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 406–09.
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Thus, with Sherbert, the non-exemption principle was demolished.
After Sherbert, incidental effects of neutral, generally applicable laws on
religion would need to survive strict constitutional scrutiny.44 This was
emphasized a decade later in Wisconsin v. Yoder, where the Court found
that Wisconsin could not constitutionally compel Amish children to attend
public school beyond the eighth grade over the religious objections of
their parents.45 The Court expressly rejected the notion that neutrality and
uniformity saved the law from judicial review, stating that “[a] regulation
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly
burdens the free exercise of religion.”46
Thus, in the span of some three decades from 1940 to the early 1970s,
the Court moved from complete deference to neutral laws of general
applicability to a regime of holding such laws to strict constitutional
scrutiny when they infringed religiously motivated conduct.
II. SMITH TURNS BACK THE CLOCK
The timeline from Gobitis to Yoder shows that a lot can change in a
few decades, and that was to prove true again. Less than thirty years after
Sherbert subjected neutral laws of general applicability to strict scrutiny,
the Court did another about-face in Smith.47
The case arose out of the denial of unemployment benefits to two
members of the Native American Church, on the basis that their
religiously inspired ingestion of peyote violated the State of Oregon’s
criminal prohibition of controlled substances.48 The Supreme Court
concluded that the denial of benefits did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause on the basis that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”49
Strangely, given that Gobitis was overruled by Barnette within three
years, the Smith Court defended its ruling by quoting Gobitis.50 More
strangely, the Court, rather than explicitly overruling Sherbert, sought to
44. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1890–91 (2021) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
45. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 219–20 (1972).
46. Id. at 220.
47. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, bb-1 to bb-4,
invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
48. Id. at 874.
49. Id. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
50. Id. (quoting the passage referenced at supra note 38 and accompanying text).
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distinguish every case that had ever applied a higher standard of scrutiny
to a neutral, generally applicable law, in strained, possibly result-oriented
reasoning reminiscent of the Reynolds case. First, it held that Sherbert’s
strict scrutiny standard was limited to an unemployment context where
individualized exemptions were permitted51—a bizarre distinction given
that Smith itself was an unemployment case where individualized
exemptions were permitted. Second, it held that other cases, such as
Yoder, which had applied strict scrutiny, did so only because the case
involved so-called “hybrid claims,” where the government action violated
both the free exercise of religion and some other constitutional right.52
This reasoning has been strongly criticized, as it effectively moots the Free
Exercise Clause, and has never been mentioned in any other constitutional
context prior to or since Smith.53
Four Justices expressed strong disagreement with the majority’s
holding in Smith. Justice O’Connor wrote that the majority’s ruling
“dramatically depart[ed] from well-settled First Amendment
jurisprudence, appear[ed] unnecessary to resolve the question presented,
and [was] incompatible with our Nation’s fundamental commitment to
individual liberty.”54 While she was highly critical of the Court’s
abandonment of Sherbert’s strict scrutiny standard, she ultimately
concurred in the judgment as she felt that Oregon had a sufficiently
compelling interest in maintaining uniform enforcement of its controlled
substance laws to justify the infringement on religious liberty.55
Meanwhile Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, arguing that the law should fail strict scrutiny under Sherbert
because the State failed to show that granting an exemption to the Native
American Church would significantly affect its efforts in combating
illegal drug trafficking.56
III. REACTION TO SMITH
Smith was deeply unpopular when it was decided, and has remained
so, although it also has its defenders.57 It was so unpopular that it led
Congress to attempt to “restore” the strict scrutiny standard for judicial
51. Id. at 883–84; see also Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1892–93
(2021) (Alito, J., concurring).
52. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
53. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1915 (Alito, J., concurring) (“To dispose of [Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)], Smith was forced to invent yet another special category of cases,
those involving ‘hybrid-rights’ claims.” (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 881)).
54. Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
55. See id. at 906–07.
56. Id. at 916–18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. See Tebbe, supra note 18, at 269, 269 nn.15–16 (citing criticisms and defenses of
Smith from both ends of the political spectrum).
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review through legislation. In 1993, a near unanimous Congress enacted
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA,” commonly pronounced,
“rifra”),58 which sought to correct Smith by providing that the
“[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion” unless the burden is imposed “in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.”59
RFRA’s effect was swiftly limited in City of Boerne v. Flores,60 in
which a Catholic Church raised a challenge under RFRA to the denial of
a construction permit under a local zoning ordinance affecting historic
landmarks.61 The Court held that RFRA could not be enforced against
state and local governments, as it exceeded Congress’s power to enforce
the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment—and thus the First—
because that power only allows Congress to enforce such rights to the
extent they are defined by the Supreme Court.62 The definition of free
exercise put forward by RFRA was inconsistent with that given by the
Supreme Court, and thus it exceeded Congress’s enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and was unconstitutional
as applied to state and local governments.63 Thus, RFRA is only a
constraint on the conduct of the federal government.64 While twenty-one
states have now joined the federal government in passing “State
RFRAs,”65 in the majority of the country, state and local governments can
enact policies that infringe religious conduct so long as the policies are
neutral and uniformly applied.
IV. SMITH SURVIVES BY A THREAD
This past Term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fulton on the
question, among others, of whether Smith should be overruled.66 The case
58. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, bb-1 to bb-4), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
59. § 2000bb-1, held unconstitutional by Flores, 521 U.S. at 507.
60. See generally Flores, 521 U.S. at 507, superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1 to cc-5.
61. Id. at 512.
62. See id. at 519.
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418,
423 (2006) (applying RFRA to the federal government’s denial of an exemption from its
prohibition on a hallucinogen contained in a sacramental tea consumed for religious purposes
and holding that the government failed its burden under RFRA).
65. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NCSL (May 4, 2017),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx
[https://perma.cc/LSG7-QA2F].
66. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 1868
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appeared properly poised for a determination on Smith’s continued
vitality: Philadelphia had a neutral policy of refusing to certify foster care
agencies that discriminated against same-sex couples as foster parents,
and was applied uniformly to all agencies.67 If Smith was upheld, the
petitioner Catholic Social Services (CSS) would be denied an exemption,
while overturning Smith would open the door to a higher level of judicial
scrutiny that might recognize an exemption. Thus, resolution of the case
appeared to require a determination on this issue. Furthermore, the Court
had recently issued a decision on COVID-19 related restrictions on
religious gatherings that was criticized as incompatible with Smith’s
neutrality principle.68
The majority, however, had other things in mind. In an opinion by
Chief Justice Roberts, it held that a single provision in Philadelphia’s
contract with CSS, which granted the Commissioner of the Department of
Human Services “sole discretion” to grant individualized exemptions
from its nondiscrimination policies, meant that the policy was not one of
general applicability, and was thus outside the scope of Smith.69 This
reasoning is dubious—the Commissioner had never granted such an
exemption, and the notion that a system of individualized exemptions
rendered a law nonneutral was itself a creation of Smith, put forward in an
effort to distinguish Sherbert, and never mentioned again until Fulton.70
Regardless of the dodge in Fulton, it is probably safe to say that
Smith’s expiration date is nearing. Three Justices were ready to overrule
it in Fulton, another three expressed significant skepticism toward it, and
not a single Justice defended the decision.71 The key question is no longer
whether Smith should be overruled, but “what should replace Smith?”72
V. REPLACING SMITH
In questioning how the Court should replace Smith, Justice Barrett
raised several concerns: whether replacing Smith’s “categorical”
neutrality approach with “an equally categorical strict scrutiny regime”
would capture the “nuance” of free exercise claims; whether entities
(2020); id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
67. See id. at 1874–76.
68. See Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1298 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that California acted neutrally by “adopt[ing] a blanket restriction on at-home gatherings of all
kinds, religious and secular alike”); Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Broke Its Own Rules
to Radically Redefine Religious Liberty, SLATE (Apr. 12, 2021, 2:51 PM) https://slate.com/
news-and-politics/2021/04/supreme-court-religious-liberty-covid-california.html [https://per
ma.cc/QVZ4-YQ8W].
69. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1878.
70. See Tebbe, supra note 18, at 298–300.
71. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 1882 (Barrett, J., concurring).
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should be treated the same as individuals; whether the Court should
distinguish between indirect and direct burdens; what forms of scrutiny to
apply; and how cases should be decided under the standard selected.73
This section argues that the best answer to Justice Barrett’s question
might well be “nothing.” That is, that the Court should simply overrule
Smith, leave the rest of free exercise jurisprudence intact, and answer the
questions that arise when they are properly presented to the Court in future
litigation. While this argument was available to the Court in Fulton, and
advanced by Justice Gorsuch,74 this Article will suggest some additional
reasons why this may be the best course.
This option may not be favored by Justices Barrett, Kavanaugh, and
Breyer, but it was endorsed by Justice Gorsuch, and joined by Justices
Alito and Thomas, while the Chief Justice and Justices Sotomayor and
Kagan were silent on the issue. As Justice Gorsuch argued, “[r]ather than
adhere to Smith until we settle on some ‘grand unified theory’ of the Free
Exercise Clause for all future cases until the end of time . . . the Court
should overrule it now, set us back on the correct course, and address each
case as it comes.”75
Justice Gorsuch also, however, joined Justice Alito’s concurrence,
which argued that Smith’s neutrality rule should be replaced with the rule
that “[a] law that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise can
be sustained only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
government interest,”76 i.e., that Smith’s rule should be replaced with a
categorical strict scrutiny regime.
The argument this Article advances is slightly different. Instead of
replacing Smith with a strict scrutiny regime, the Court could simply issue
an opinion that concludes, hypothetically: “Smith was wrongly decided.
Neutral laws of general applicability are not automatically shielded from
scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. Smith, and any language in prior
or subsequent cases to the contrary, is hereby overruled. All other free
exercise cases that have not been explicitly overruled remain effective to
the extent they are consistent with this order.”
A. Answering Justice Barrett
This proposal seems like an unusual suggestion because it apparently
answers none of Justice Barrett’s concerns. However, the answers to
many of the “issues to work through if Smith were overruled”77 would in
fact be answered simply by removing Smith and requiring litigants and
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 1883.
See id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2086–87 (2019)).
Id. at 1924 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring).
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courts to turn to other sources of law in resolving free exercise claims.
Consider the “issues” highlighted:
1. “Should entities like Catholic Social Services—which is an arm
of the Catholic Church—be treated differently than
individuals?”78
It is difficult to see how removing Smith affects this analysis. That
entities like CSS, which are organized for an explicit religious purpose,
are entitled to at least some of the protection of the Free Exercise Clause
seems uncontroversial—and none of the Justices doubted that CSS was
entitled to its protection.79 The Court has already held that religious
institutions are completely exempt from nondiscrimination laws in the
employment relationship with their “ministers,” a fact Justice Barrett was
surely aware of as she cited a case involving the doctrine in her
concurrence.80 This holding is unlikely to be affected by overturning
Smith. While the Court has not explicitly assessed the free exercise rights
of corporations,81 it is not clear that the question is affected at all by
overturning Smith.
2. “Should there be a distinction between indirect and direct
burdens on religious exercise?”82
This question is more directly relevant as Smith itself drew a hard line
between indirect burdens, which it held fully constitutional so long as the
law is neutral and generally applicable, and direct burdens, which are
generally unconstitutional.83 However, the answer to this question can
also be found in existing precedent. Here Justice Barrett cites Braunfeld
v. Brown, which upheld a Sunday closing law against a group of Jewish
merchants’ free exercise challenge.84 The merchants argued that, because
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., id. at 1883 (describing CSS’s religious mission).
80. Id. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring).
81. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014), held that the statutory
language in RFRA extended to a closely held corporation under a very narrowly defined set of
facts, and it is unclear whether its reasoning would extend to the Free Exercise Clause—and
overturning Smith would not disturb Hobby Lobby as RFRA would remain on the books. On
the other hand, decisions such as Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), which assessed the right of a bakery to refuse service on
religious grounds, suggest that the Court will be hospitable to for-profit businesses seeking
religious exemption.
82. Fulton, 366 U.S. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring).
83. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) for a case
decided under Smith that found government conduct directly targeted religion when a law
banned only those animal slaughter practices consistent with rituals of the Santeria faith, and
there was evidence that the law was motivated by hostility to the Santeria.
84. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 602–03 (1961).
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their faith compelled them to close on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath,
requiring them to also close on Sundays put them “at a serious economic
disadvantage.”85 The Court termed this an indirect burden, and found that
such a burden was insufficient to overcome the State’s interest in a
uniform day of rest.86
While some of the language in Braunfeld is consistent with Smith’s
neutrality approach,87 the decision also acknowledged that an incidental
burden could violate the Free Exercise Clause when “the State may
accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden.”88
This is consistent with the Court’s decision in Sherbert, which required a
compelling state interest to justify an incidental burden on religious
exercise.89 Thus, if the Court were to overrule Smith using language such
as that suggested above, lower courts and other decision makers would
know to disregard the neutrality language in Braunfeld—and between
Braunfeld and Sherbert, would be able to find that laws that incidentally
burden religious conduct require compelling state interests that cannot be
achieved by other means, i.e., that such laws must withstand strict
scrutiny. While the cases had different outcomes, there are distinguishing
factors. The burden in Sherbert was arguably more direct, as the
government there sought to compel labor on the Seventh Day Adventist
Sabbath,90 while the government in Braunfeld prohibited labor on a day
that had no meaning to the Jewish merchants and did not require them to
work on their own Sabbath.91 Furthermore, the Court in Braunfeld placed
great weight on the state interest in a “weekly respite from all labor,”92
while the Sherbert Court was unconvinced by South Carolina’s
speculation that allowing the religious exemption might lead to a wave of
fraudulent claims that would dilute the unemployment compensation fund
and threaten the availability of labor for “necessary Saturday work.”93
In short, the answer to Justice Barrett’s second question is that, in the
event Smith was narrowly overruled, lower courts would simply apply
other Free Exercise precedents when assessing indirect and direct burdens
on religious exercise, and decide cases based on comparison to those
precedents.
85. Id. at 602.
86. Id. at 606–07.
87. See id. at 605–06 (stating that a person “has no natural right in opposition to his
social duties” (emphasis added) (quoting 8 Works of Thomas Jefferson 113)).
88. Id. at 607.
89. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), abrogation recognized by Holt v.
Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015).
90. Id. at 398.
91. Bruanfeld, 366 U.S. at 601.
92. Id. at 607.
93. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
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3. “What forms of scrutiny should apply?”94
Of the questions Justice Barrett posed, this is the one that would
probably be the most useful for the Court to explicitly answer in any
decision overruling Smith. But, again, it is not clear that existing law
could not supply an answer to this question were the Court to simply
overrule Smith. Prior to Smith, it was apparently well-accepted that strict
scrutiny under Sherbert applied to laws that burdened religious conduct—
whether or not the laws were neutral.
Thus, even in the Smith litigation itself, the Oregon Supreme Court
cited Sherbert for the proposition that a constraint on religious activity
must be “the least restrictive means of achieving a ‘compelling’ state
interest.”95 When the U.S. Supreme Court overruled that decision, the
concurring and dissenting Justices made it clear that they viewed the
majority’s decision as a significant departure from a clearly established
rule.96 Less than a decade before Smith, the Court itself had cited Sherbert
for the statement that laws infringing on religious liberty must be “the least
restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.”97 Smith
did not explicitly overrule Sherbert or Thomas, instead pigeonholing both
as limited to “the unemployment compensation field.”98 This distinction
was dubious—as Justice Alito observed in Fulton, neither Sherbert nor
Thomas placed any emphasis on the unemployment context, and Smith
itself arose in the unemployment context.99 If Smith were narrowly
overruled in the manner suggested, lower courts could simply return to
those cases, read them for what they actually say, and apply them
accordingly to new fact scenarios as they arise.
Justice Barrett cites Gillette v. United States as having applied a
“substantial” rather than “compelling” interest test.100 But the Gillette
decision, which rejected a religious exemption from military conscription
that was based on “conscientious objection to a particular war, rather than
objection to war as such,”101 does not actually state a specific standard of
review. It cites Sherbert for the statement that even neutral laws may
94. Fulton, 366 U.S. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring).
95. Smith v. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res., 721 P.2d 445, 449 (Or. 1986) (citing
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403), vacated, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
96. See Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (O’Connor,
J., concurring), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, bb-1 to bb-4, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997);
id. at 907–08 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
98. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
99. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1893 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring) (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,
462 (1971)).
101. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 439.
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violate the Free Exercise Clause “when the burden on First Amendment
values is not justifiable in terms of the Government’s valid aims.”102
Then, in explaining why the law was justified, the Court stated that “[t]he
incidental burdens felt by persons in petitioners’ position are strictly
justified by substantial government interests that relate directly to the very
impacts questioned.”103 This line does not purport to announce any rule,
and the Court at the time was not always rigorous in defining and citing
levels of scrutiny. The citation to Sherbert in Gillette, together with the
affirmation of strict scrutiny the following decade in Thomas, are
sufficient to guide lower courts in the event Smith is overturned without
the Court declaring a new standard.
This conclusion may not fully satisfy Justice Barrett’s concern that
“resolution of conflicts between generally applicable laws and other First
Amendment rights—like speech and assembly—has been much more
nuanced” than a categorical strict scrutiny regime.104 It seems likely that
she was referring to the Court’s jurisprudence involving general laws that
burden expressive, but nonverbal, conduct under the Free Speech Clause,
and the Court’s cases concerning time, place, and manner restrictions on
public expression.105
For example, in United States v. O’Brien, the Court upheld a criminal
defendant’s conviction for burning a Selective Service Certificate on the
basis that the prohibition on burning the certificate served “a legitimate
and substantial purpose” in the administration of the military.106 The
Court applied what some have termed a “weak”107 or “unserious”108
version of intermediate scrutiny, which provided that a government
regulation survived Free Speech review “if it furthers an important or
substantial government interest; if [it] is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.”109
The language “unrelated to the suppression of free expression” is
arguably analogous to Smith’s “neutral laws of general applicability.”
And while O’Brien did not go so far as Smith, both decisions are consistent
with a view that such laws are less constitutionally suspect than those that
directly target speech or religion.
102. Id. at 462 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
103. Id.
104. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring).
105. See Douglas Laycock & Thomas C. Berg, Protecting Free Exercise Under Smith
and After Smith, 2021 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 33, 46–47 (2021).
106. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375, 378 (1968).
107. Laycock & Berg, supra note 105, at 46 n.75.
108. Tebbe, supra note 18, at 282 n.77.
109. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
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While O’Brien’s reasoning might have been strained with respect to
the application of the standard to the facts,110 the adoption of something
akin to the O’Brien standard to govern free exercise challenges to neutral
laws of general applicability would not be unreasonable.111 An
intermediate standard would recognize the basic idea that laws that apply
equally to everyone are fairer than those that intentionally target people or
groups, an idea present in other areas of law like race discrimination.112 It
would also make the swing from Smith’s non-exemption rule less
disruptive and would force lower courts to engage more seriously with the
interests pursued by laws—such as those prohibiting LGBTQ
discrimination—as opposed to granting exemptions as a matter of course
under strict scrutiny.
However, again, it is not apparent that the Court must decide whether
or not to import O’Brien to the free exercise context in order to overrule
Smith. None of the Court’s pre-Smith decisions foreclose the possibility
that similar principles to those set forth in O’Brien might also apply in the
free exercise context. If Smith were overruled, and lower courts found
that Sherbert meant strict scrutiny applied, it would not foreclose litigants
from arguing that O’Brien should be used as a model. After all, Sherbert
would only set forth a general rule of strict scrutiny—just as the general
rule is that infringements on free speech must withstand scrutiny—and the
O’Brien intermediate scrutiny only applies when the expression at issue
is “combined” with “‘nonspeech’ elements”113 and the government has a
neutral interest unrelated to the suppression of expression.114
4. “[If] strict scrutiny [applies], would pre-Smith cases rejecting
free exercise challenges to garden-variety laws come out the
same way?”115
Justice Barrett’s final question is also an intriguing one; however,
again, the suggested language for overturning Smith would allow
surviving case law to stand on its own terms.

110. As Professors Laycock and Berg observe, the administrative convenience relied
upon usually fails intermediate scrutiny, and it was a particularly flimsy basis to justify the
serious sanction of a criminal conviction. Laycock & Berg, supra note 105, at 46.
111. See Daniel J. Hay, Baptizing O’Brien: Towards Intermediate Protection of
Religiously Motivated Expressive Conduct, 68 VAND. L. REV. 177 (2015) (arguing that O’Brien
should be adapted to the free exercise context).
112. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring a showing of both
discriminatory purpose and effect for strict scrutiny to apply in an equal protection challenge).
113. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
114. See id. at 409–11 (holding that Texas lacked an interest in prohibiting flag burning
that was unrelated to the suppression of expression, and that the Court was accordingly “outside
of O’Brien’s test altogether”).
115. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (2021) (Barrett, J., concurring).
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For example, here Justice Barrett cited to a passage in Smith that
referenced three cases from the late 1980s that apparently did not apply
strict scrutiny.116 Two of these cases, O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz and
Goldman v. Weinberger, arose in the unique contexts of prisons and the
military, where rights are more restricted and the government has a greater
interest in uniformity.117 The final case cited, Bowen v. Roy, vacillated
between language that forecast Smith’s turn and adherence to the Sherbert
standard.118 Again, the proposed language for revising Smith would have
the effect of nullifying those portions of Bowen that suggest neutrality
alone spares a law from free exercise scrutiny.119 Courts would then be
free to assess whether the remainder of the Bowen reasoning survived.
What of pre-Sherbert cases that upheld “garden variety” laws under
a neutrality standard, such as cases upholding anti-bigamy laws120 or
vaccination mandates?121 Perhaps overruling Smith could precipitate
reconsideration of those cases. But again, there is no reason that all this
need be determined in one fell swoop.
In the case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, which upheld a state
vaccination program, the Court did use some language noting the need for
neutrality and for religious individuals in a society to conform their
conduct to the requirements of the law,122 but the decision also focused on
the State’s interest in protecting the public health and welfare.123 Lower
courts could read a reversal of Smith that does not touch Jacobson to mean
that state vaccination mandates remain constitutional so long as the
programs are properly tailored to a public health need using the
framework from Jacobson and subsequent cases for guidance.

116. See id. (citing Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888–89
(1990)).
117. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1987); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986).
118. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 704 (1986).
119. See id.
120. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878).
121. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905).
122. See, e.g., id. at 26 (“[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to
every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all
times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.”); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164
(“Congress was deprived [by the Free Exercise Clause] of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive
of good order.”).
123. The Court analyzed the vaccination program at issue, how it delegated authority, its
scientific basis, and its impact on the individual, and determined that it did not go “beyond what
was reasonably required for the safety of the public.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28. The case was
decided prior to the adoption of tiers of scrutiny, but the Court was nevertheless weighing the
strength of the government’s need against the burden on the individual in a manner that reflects
modern strict scrutiny analysis.
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While Reynolds relied much more on the dichotomy between beliefs
and conduct,124 it also focused on the perceived social degeneracy caused
by polygamy,125 and permitted a jury instruction on “the evil
consequences that were supposed to flow from plural marriages.”126 Thus,
overruling Smith while leaving Reynolds intact would allow courts to infer
that the public interest in preventing polygamy outweighs the burden on
religion imposed by such bans. On the other hand, if the reasoning in
Reynolds—much of which is tinged with open racism127—does not hold
up under closer scrutiny, then it should be reconsidered in its turn. But
that is a decision that does not need to come at the same time as one on
Smith.
This shows that neither Reynolds nor Jacobson need be revisited as a
precedent to revisiting Smith, and both older decisions can stand on their
own in the absence of Smith. Thus, it is possible that those older decisions
would still be upheld under a strict scrutiny regime. After all, neither
decision was overruled in the wake of Sherbert.
This analysis shows that, from a legalistic standpoint, a narrow
overruling of Smith that does not announce a new rule in its place would
not raise significant doctrinal challenges nor require answering a host of
questions to guide every free exercise case for all eternity, but would in
fact bring greater clarity to free exercise jurisprudence by removing a
problematic case from the hornbook.
B. Prudential Considerations
There are also strong prudential reasons for the Court to overrule
Smith narrowly. The Court’s inconsistent Free Exercise decisions128 have
created an appearance that such decisions are not the product of cool,
dispassionate legal analysis, but are rather driven by the policy
preferences of the Court’s majority at any given time.129 Of course, many
would argue that this is the way it has always been, in every area of the
law, and that there is nothing to be done for it but to work to get Justices
124. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
125. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 (“[P]olygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and
which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism . . . .”).
126. Id. at 168.
127. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
128. See supra Parts I–II.
129. See, e.g., Tebbe, supra note 18, at 269 (accusing the Court of “overwrought
reasoning” and “settl[ing] for contrived justifications for its outcomes”); Leslie Kendrick &
Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 135–36 (2018)
(accusing the Court of placing “etiquette” over “reason-giving” in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd.
v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018), only to “abdicate” that demand for “tolerance
and respect” when upholding President Trump’s travel ban in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392
(2018)).
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who share one’s political convictions onto the Court.
Still, it is noteworthy just how jarring the swings in the Court’s free
exercise jurisprudence have been, particularly with regard to neutral laws
of general applicability. When Reynolds laid down a strict belief/action
dichotomy, it enforced that dichotomy against Mormon challengers who
were part of a deeply unfavored religious minority130 with an abysmal
track record at the Supreme Court.131 The decision revealed little
sympathy for the claimants and used racist language to describe the
practice of polygamy, such that the outcome appears preordained.132
The abrupt reversal from Gobitis in 1940 to Barnette in 1943 is also
intriguing. Is it a coincidence that the Court abruptly changed its opinion
on mandatory flag salutes after the country went to war with an
authoritarian regime famous for compelling a very similar salute?
The Free Exercise Clause was expanded to its broadest terms under
the Warren Court with Sherbert in 1963. The Warren Court was of course
famous for being perhaps the most liberal era in the Court’s history, a time
when the Court was more solicitous toward claimants from historically
disfavored groups133 and dramatically expanded the understanding of the
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.134
By the time of Smith, the conservative William Rehnquist was Chief
Justice, and the Court’s makeup had been altered by conservative
Republican presidents in the 1970s and 1980s, including Richard Nixon,
who began the so-called War on Drugs,135 and Ronald Reagan, who

130. In one extreme example, the governor of Missouri in 1838 issued an executive order
to treat all Mormons “as enemies [who] must be exterminated or driven from the state if
necessary,” leading about ninety percent of the state’s Mormon population to depart. This order
was not rescinded until 1976. See Steve Pokin, Pokin Around: Was There Ever a Time in
Missouri when You Could Legally Kill a Mormon?, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Sept. 1, 2018,
11:31
PM),
https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/local/ozarks/2018/09/01/missouriexecutive-order-44-mormon-war/1147461002/ [https://perma.cc/VLG8-73QL].
131. Other noteworthy defeats in this era include Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 66 (1890) (affirming the revocation of the
church’s charter and confiscation of its property) and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 348 (1890)
(affirming an Idaho law requiring voters to affirm that they are not members of an organization
that teaches polygamy).
132. See supra note 27.
133. See Tebbe, supra note 18, at 317 (“During the Warren Court, not a single plaintiff
in a free exercise case was a member of a mainstream Christian religion.”).
134. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 5, 5 (1993) (describing a “constitutional revolution embarked upon by the Warren
Court” that involved two major developments: the idea of “a [living] constitution that evolves
according to changing values and circumstances,” and “the reemergence of the discourse of
rights as a dominant constitutional mode”).
135. See Susan Stuart, War as Metaphor and the Rule of Law in Crisis: The Lessons we
Should Have Learned from the War on Drugs, 36 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 1, 5 (2011).
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significantly expanded it.136 Was Smith’s methodological dissembling of
the previous thirty years of free exercise jurisprudence truly an endeavor
in cold legal reasoning, or was it a means to the desired end: denying a
religious exemption for the use of a criminalized drug?
And now, thirty years after the three most liberal Justices of the time,
Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, voted to preserve religious exemptions
in Smith, the situation has apparently reversed. In the COVID-19 cases
and in Fulton, the more conservative the Justice, the more vehement their
attack on Smith; the more liberal, the more supportive of neutrality. Is it
a coincidence that this reversal has happened at a time when it is religious
conservatives, traditionally the dominant group setting the laws, that now
finds themselves seeking exemption from neutral laws of general
applicability that are supported by political and judicial liberals?
What to make of all of this? Again, many might say that this is an
inevitable feature of our judiciary that can only be changed by changing
the composition of the Court. However, for the vast majority of us who
have little say in the composition of the Court aside from our votes in
presidential and senatorial elections, persuasion should not be cast aside
as a political tool.
It is not good for the Court or for the American people to have a free
exercise jurisprudence that swings in abrupt rounds and turns depending
on what political party has appointed more Justices, what type of plaintiff
is seeking religious accommodation, or what type of government conduct
is at issue. The Justices of the Supreme Court should not consider this
acceptable either.
All that said, while the narrow approach to overturning Smith will not
itself forestall accusations that the Court is a political entity, it would be a
more measured step than many the Court has taken in the past. It would
allow a reset of free exercise jurisprudence, during which time lower
courts could look to a broader range of authorities for answers, consider
cases from a variety of angles and based on a variety of factors, and thus
spend time carefully weighing the balancing interests, rather than
engaging in a single-minded analysis of whether a law meets the standard
of “neutral and generally applicable” or not. This would also give the
Supreme Court itself more time to grapple with how to engage in the
difficult line-drawing exercises such as those required in cases involving
religious challenges to LGBTQ antidiscrimination laws.

136. Sawyer Like, Burning in the Melting Pot: American Policing and the Internal
Colonization of African Americans, 22 RUTGERS & RACE L. REV. 333, 361–63 (2021)
(describing various efforts made by Reagan and his allies throughout the 1980s to increase
opposition to drug use and to make drug enforcement increasingly punitive).
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C. Summary
This Part has argued that, in the event Smith is overruled, the Court
should overrule it narrowly, without attempting to set out an elaborate
theory for resolving future free exercise claims. Simply overruling Smith
will not cause any doctrinal issues and may actually go a long way toward
clarifying free exercise jurisprudence. Furthermore, prudence cautions
against further action that will inject more inconsistency, confusion, and
bitterness into the canon of free exercise case law, to the detriment of
litigants, courts, and the American people.
CONCLUSION
Fulton left free exercise jurisprudence on a knife’s edge. Only time
will tell whether Smith will be overruled, although it appears to be in its
final days. In three recent orders denying emergency relief from COVID19 vaccine mandates based on religious exemptions, the same three
Justices who argued for overturning Smith have dissented from the denial
of relief.137 Thus the Fulton majority remains intact for now. This Article
seeks to contribute to what will surely be a growing body of scholarship
responding to Justice Barrett’s prompt. It is my hope that the Justices will
take this scholarship seriously and proceed in a manner that will bring
greater clarity and stability to free exercise jurisprudence.

137. See Does v. Mills, 142 S. Ct. 17, 18 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Dr. A v.
Hochul, 142 S. Ct. 552, 552 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Austin v. U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26,
142 S. Ct. 1301, 1302 (2022) (Alito, J., dissenting) (mem.).

